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SEX DISCRIMINATION: THE PREGNANCY-
RELATED DISABILITY EXCLUSION
STANLEY SCHAIR "
The United States Supreme Court, on June 17, 1974, handed down
its decision in Geduldig v. Aiello,1 holding that a state disability in-
surance program for private employees which excludes from coverage
disabilities relating to normal pregnancy and childbirth does not in-
vidiously discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. Less than one year later, on May 27, 1975, the Court granted
a petition for a writ of certiorari in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Wetzel 2 to review a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit which concluded that a similar program, this time
created by a private employer, constituted sex discrimination pro-
scribed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.8 A decision by the
Court is anticipated during its 1975-1976 term.
Paid sick leave and disability benefits provisions which exclude
pregnancy-related disabilities under state or private programs have in
recent times also become the subject of close scrutiny by state and local
equal employment agencies and courts.4 In addition, their validity
under federal enactments other than Title VII and executive orders
directed at eliminating sex discrimination in employment is not free
from doubt.5
An affirmance by the Supreme Court in Liberty Mutual would end
this much litigated controversy for all but the very smallest employers
O Co-Chairman, Subcommittee of ABA Section of Labor Relations Law; Secretary,
New York State Bar Association Committee on Labor Law; Associate Editor, Annual
Supplements to ABA SEc. oF LABOR RELATIONS LAw, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw: THE
BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Aar (1971). LL.B., St. John's
University, 1965.
1417 U.S. 484 (1974).
2 95 S. Ct. 1989, granting cert. to 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975). Petitions for writs of
certiorari have also been filed as a result of two other Titie VII cases involving the
validity of excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from disability plans. See Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 10 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1201 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 44
U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 74-1589); Communications Workers of America v.
AT&T, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 8684 (U.S. June
19, 1975) (No. 74-1601). These cases are discussed in notes 96-114 and accompanying text
infra.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
4 See, e.g., Board of Educ. (City of New York) v. State Div. of Human Rights, 35
N.Y.2d 675, 319 N.E.2d 203, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974) (mem.), aff'g 42 App. Div. 2d 854, 346
N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1973).
5 See text accompanying notes 121-26 infra.
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in this country having similar disability provisions. All employers,
both in the public and private sectors, employing 15 or more employ-
ees,0 would probably be required to eliminate from any such existing
sickness or disability programs any blanket exclusion of pregnancy-
related disabilities. The financial implications of such a decision would
no doubt be enormous. The State of California, whose program was
under attack in Aiello, estimated that the cost of providing benefits for
pregnancy-related disabilities under its program alone would be be-
tween $120 and $131 million per year.7 Experts have predicted that the
annual cost of adding maternity benefits to the sickness and accident
disability income plans currently in effect in the United States would
be in the area of $1,300 million.8
A reversal by the Supreme Court in Liberty Mutual, however,
may not provide the last word on this subject either for the substantial
portion of the work force covered by such plans9 or for their employers
and unions. Just as it has been successfully argued in numerous state
and federal appellate courts' 0 that the Supreme Court decision in
Aiello was decided in a constitutional context and is therefore not
controlling in the interpretation of Title VII or other federal or state
statutes barring sex discrimination in employment, it might similarly
be contended that a ruling under Title VII is not determinative of the
same question under a local or state statute or even under other federal
enactments such as the Equal Pay Act of 1963.11
This Article will review the status of the law respecting the valid-
ity of pregnancy-related disability exclusions under the United States
Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, other major
federal enactments and regulations governing sex discrimination in the
employment context, and the laws of the State of New York.12
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. I1, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
7 417 U.S. at 494 n.18.
8 See Brief for Appellant at 8, Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 10 BNA Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1201 (4th Cir. 1975).
9 It was estimated by one expert that some 32 million employees in the United States
under age 65 are covered by sickness and accident disability insurance. See id.
10 See, e.g., Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 11 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1 (6th Cir.
1975); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 11 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 161 (9th
Cir. 1975); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 10 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1201 (4th Cir.
1975); Communications Workers of America v. AT&T, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975);
Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975); Union Free School Dist.
No. 6 (Town of Islip) v. New York State Human Rights App. Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371, 320
NX.E2d 859, 362 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1974).
1129 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
12Numerous states have laws proscribing sex discrimination in employment. The
New York experience is highlighted here because of a determination by its highest court
that in construing New York's law against sex discrimination, Aiello and other court
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PARALLEL REMEDIES IN MULTIPLE FoRuMs
More than 32 million women are in the labor force in the United
States. They constitute at least 38 percent of all workers and their
numbers are growing. The United States Labor Department has es-
timated that 9 out of 10 females will work outside the home at some
time during their lives.'8 During the period from 1950 to 1969, the
number of employed women in the United States rose 68 percent while
the number of men employed increased only 17 percent.14
As the number and relative importance of females in the work
force have grown, so has the network of government regulations de-
signed to create equal employment opportunity and eliminate sex-based
discrimination in employment. In 1963, with the passage of the Equal
Pay Act,15 Congress established the principle of equal pay for equal
work. It assigned enforcement responsibilities under this law to the
Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor0
and specifically empowered the Secretary of Labor to restrain alleged
sex discrimination. In addition, the remedial scheme included a civil
cause of action for aggrieved employees. 17
One year later Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18
including in Title VII thereof broad protection for women and minor-
ities by prohibiting discrimination in compensation and in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment. To effectuate the goals of Title
VII, Congress created the United States Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC). 19 The EEOC was given the power to issue
regulations and guidelines indicating proscribed discriminatory em-
ployment practices. 20 It also was empowered to entertain and determine
claims of discrimination and, since 1972, to initiate court proceedings
against offending employers, unions, and employment agencies.
21
determinations concerning pregnancy and childbirth are not controlling. Presumably, it
will not consider itself bound by any United States Supreme Court decision in Liberty
Mutual. See text accompanying notes 129-46 infra.
18 This statistic was reported in 1972 in a fact sheet issued by the Women's Bureau
of the Employment Standards Administration of the U.. Department of Labor.
14This statistic was reported in "Equal Pay" (Publication 1320) of the Wage and
Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor.
15 Act of June 10, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, amending Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
1629 U.S.C. §§ 204, 206(d)(3), 211, 216 (1970).
17 Id. §§ 216, 217.
1842 id. §§ 2000a-2000h (1970), as amended (Supp. I1, 1973).
19 Id. § 2000e-4 (1970), as amended (Supp. I1, 1973).
20Id. § 2000e-12.
21 Id. § 2000e-5 (Supp. I1, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
[Vol. 49:684
1975] PREGNANCY RELATED DISABILITY EXCLUSION 687
Claimants themselves were also given access to the federal courts. 22 Title
VII permits consideration of employment discrimination claims suc-
cessively, and in certain instances simultaneously, in several different
forums including state and local courts and equal employment agencies,
the EEOC, and the federal courts.23
The Supreme Court recently noted that "over the past decade,
Congress has ... manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based clas-
sifications." 24 The same comment might be employed to describe the
Court itself. By finding violations of the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the Court, in recent years,
has become increasingly active in removing sex-based discrimination 2 5
That same sensitivity to sex-based discrimination has also been at work
in the third branch of the federal government. In September 1965,
President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,24628 making it manda-
tory for federal contractors to include in each contract an equal oppor-
tunity clause and requiring the contractor to take affirmative action to
insure that minorities are employed. This Executive Order, as amended
in 1967 by Executive Order 11,375,2T prohibited discrimination in em-
ployment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In
addition, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) was
created to carry out enforcement of the provisions.
On the state and local levels of government there has been a
proliferation of regulation aimed at eliminating sex discrimination in
employment. Since 1965, for example, the New York State Human
Rights Law28 has contained a broad prohibition against sex discrimina-
tion in employment. Additionally, the City of New York has enacted
its own laws in this area.29
The public policy which has found widespread expression in this
ever-growing and complex network of federal and state regulations has
also found its way into the forum of labor arbitration. It is not uncom-
mon for collective bargaining agreements between employers and
unions to contain clauses barring sex discrimination. 0 These clauses
22Id. For an analysis of Title VII see Miller, Sex Discrimination and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REv. 877 (1967).
2342 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (Supp. II, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
24Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973).
25 See, e.g., id.; Reed v. Reed, 404 US. 71 (1971).
26 3 C..R. 169 (1974).
2732 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967). This Executive Order has in part been superseded by
Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 207 (1974), which requires executive departments and
agencies of the federal government to establish affirmative action programs.
28 N.Y. Exuc. LAW §§ 290 et seq. (McKinney 1972).
29 Nmv Yopm, N.Y. Arnnx. CODE ch. 1, § B1-7.0 (1971), as amended (Supp. 1974).
80 See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 US. 36, 39 (1974).
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are often enforceable under the agreements' grievance-arbitration pro-
visions and under the state and federal laws which encourage and
regulate labor arbitration.
Although the foregoing discussion is not intended to exhaust
the entire catalogue of regulations in the area, it does highlight the
major remedial avenues open to victims of sex discrimination in em-
ployment. In addition, it illustrates the parallel and overlapping rem-
edies and the multiplicity of forums - each completely independent
of the others - which have become available in this area. Employees,
their employers, and unions alike have experienced the resulting con-
fusion. Both employers and unions have found themselves defending
different causes of action arising out of a single discrimination claim in
two or more different forums.8 1 And the lack of success experienced by
a claimant in one forum does not usually preclude resort to another
or even several others.8 2 The substantial litigation expenses involved
as well as the risk that different forums will render differing decisions
have led to unsuccessful attempts by defendants to import into this
area the traditional doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver,
and election of remedies.8 3
The finality issue reached the Supreme Court in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.84 in the context of a dispute over whether an
adverse arbitration decision under a nondiscrimination clause in a
collective bargaining agreement foreclosed a subsequent action on the
same claim under Title VII. The Court held that it does not. Speaking
generally about laws aimed at eliminating discrimination, it noted that
legislative enactments in the area "have long evinced a general intent
to accord parallel and overlapping remedies .. ."3; Because, as the
Court observed, Congress desired to grant its policy against discrimina-
tion the "highest priority," it provided in Title VII for consideration
of discrimination claims both in the federal courts and in state and local
agencies and courts.8 6 Moreover, the Court noted that resort to one
forum will not generally preclude later submission of the same claim
81 For example, discharge of an employee in New York State who later dains that
he or she has been the victim of sex-based discrimination might find its way to the New
York State Department of Labor, and/or its Unemployment Insurance Division, both the
New York State and New York City equal employment agencies, the EEOC, the OFCC,
the U.S. Department of Labor, arbitration, and the federal courts. See notes 15-S0 and
accompanying text supra.
82 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
33 Id. at 46.
84 Id. at 36.
85 Id. at 47.
86 Id.
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to another. 7 In other words, the Court read the legislative history of
Title VII as permitting an individual to pursue his rights under both
Title VII and any other applicable state or federal statutes, "[t]he clear
inference [being] that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather
than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination." 38
Applying the Alexander rationale to the pregnancy-related disabil-
ity exclusion, it becomes clear that any disability benefits program
incorporating this exclusion must be examined in light of all existing
federal, state, and local laws and regulations relating to employment
discrimination based on sex.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
It was not until late 1973 that the Supreme Court was presented
with cases involving pregnancy-related disabilities. These cases arose
in the context of maternity leave regulations governing public em-
ployees, primarily public school teachers. At the time these suits were
brought, Title VII did not apply to state agencies and public educa-
tional institutions3 9 and, therefore, these initial challenges to manda-
tory maternity leave rules were initiated under the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.
Conflicts had arisen among the circuits. In Green v. Waterford
Board of Education,40 Buckley v. Coyle Public School System, 41 and
LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education,42 the Courts of Appeals for
the Second, Tenth, and Sixth Circuits, respectively, held that manda-
tory maternity leaves for pregnant schoolteachers were violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Schattman
v. Texas Employment Commission43 and Cohen v. Chesterfield County
School Board,4 4 on the other hand, mandatory leave policies were up-
held by the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Fourth Circuits, re-
spectively, both courts having found that the regulations established
classifications which were reasonable and thus not violative of the four-
teenth amendment. To resolve the conflict, the Supreme Court granted
37 Id. at 47-48.
3s8 Id. at 48-49.
39 The Equal Employment Act of 1972 amended Title VII making it applicable to
public as well as private employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1970).
40 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
41476 F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973).
42465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 US. 632 (1974).
43459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
44 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974).
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certiorari in both LaFleur and Cohen, deciding the cases together on
January 21, 1974 as Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.45
The Cleveland rule challenged in LaFleur required every preg-
nant schoolteacher to take maternity leave without pay beginning five
months before the expected birth of her child. Return to work was
not permitted before the beginning of the next school term following
the date the child reached three months of age. Reemployment was
not guaranteed; the teacher was merely given priority in reassignment.46
The Virginia regulation involved in Cohen similarly required the preg-
nant teacher to leave work four months before the expected birth.
Reemployment no later than the first day of the school year following
the date of a finding of reeligibility, however, was guaranteed. This
finding was to be based upon written notice of physical fitness and the
teacher's assurance that child care would not interfere with employ-
ment.47
In striking down both mandatory leave provisions as violative of
due process, the Court held that the right to choose marriage and a
family is a fundamental right protected by the fourteenth amendment:
By acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a
child, overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a
heavy burden on the exercise of these protected freedoms. Because
public school maternity leave rules directly affect "one of the basic
civil rights of man,"... the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that such rules must not needlessly, arbitrar-
ily, or capriciously impinge upon this vital area of a teacher's
constitutional liberty.48
The purpose of these regulations, the boards of education argued, was
to achieve continuity of classroom instruction and insure the presence
of a physically capable teacher. The Court noted that continuity of in-
struction, a perfectly legitimate educational goal, might support a re-
quirement of advance notice to the school of the expected date of birth;
however, "the absolute requirements of termination at the end of the
fourth or fifth month" were not considered wholly rational.49 Ironically,
as the Court illustrated, the arbitrary cutoff date might hinder the at-
tainent of the very continuity sought by requiring teachers to leave
45 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
46 Id. at 635 n.1.
47 Id. at 637 n.5.
48Id. at 640 (citation omitted).
49 Id, at 642,
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midsemester even though they might be willing and able to complete
the school year.50
As to physical fitness, the Court concluded that
the provisions amount to a conclusive presumption that every
pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy
is physically incapable of continuing... The rules contain an ir-
rebuttable presumption of physical incompetency, and that pre-
sumption applies even when the medical evidence as to an
individual woman's physical status might be wholly to the con-
trary.51
Because the requirement that teachers not return until the beginning
of the following semester was rationally related to the desired conti-
nuity, this part of the regulation was upheld. The requirement in the
Cleveland rule that the teacher's child be three months old, however,
was held to be arbitrary and irrational.52
The Supreme Court in LaFleur, it must be emphasized, never
addressed the issue of sex discrimination. The due process analysis of
the case by the majority53 made it unnecessary to determine whether
the maternity leave policies in question constituted sex discrimination
or whether pregnancy was a valid classification under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus the LaFleur deci-
sion was to have little, if any, impact when the pregnancy issue again
presented itself to the Court later that same year in Geduldig v.
Aiello.54
The California disability insurance system involved in Aiello ex-
cluded disabilities attributable to normal pregnancies from coverage.
This exclusion was attacked as being violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Benefits under the system were paid to persons in private em-
ployment temporarily unable to work because of disabilities not cov-
ered by workmen's compensation. The program, funded entirely from
employee contributions at the rate of 1 percent of salary to a maximum
of $85 per year, excluded "any injury or illness caused by or arising
5old. at 643.
5lId. at 644.
52 Id. at 650.
53Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Bla-cnun joined. Justice Douglas concurred in the result without
filing an opinion. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion rejecting the irrebuttable
presumption approach as an inappropriate frame of reference and adopting an equal
protection analysis. Id. at 651. Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented. Id. at
657.
54 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy
and for a period of 28 days thereafter."'55
A three-judge federal court ruled that the exclusion of pregnancy-
related disabilities was not based upon a classification having a rational
and substantial relationship with a legitimate state purpose. Accord-
ingly, it violated the equal protection clause.56 The Supreme Court
reversed. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, observed that the
state intended to establish its disability benefits system as an "insurance
program ... to function essentially in accordance with insurance con-
cepts." 57 He pointed out that the state structured its program with a
level of benefits and risks designed to maintain solvency at a 1 percent
level of employee contribution. To cover the risks excluded, the Court
noted, would be "substantially more costly." In addition, it would re-
quire an increase in the employee contribution rate, a decrease in the
level of benefits, state subsidization, or a combination of these possi-
bilities.5 8
The Court upheld the program as "rationally supportable."5 The
State, it said, had legitimate interests in maintaining the self-supporting
nature of its program and in distributing the available resources in
such a way as to keep benefits payments at a level adequate for cov-
ered disabilities, "rather than to cover all disabilities inadequately."'60
It also had a legitimate concern, the Court added, in keeping the con-
tribution rate at a level which would not unduly burden participating
employees.01 State policy determinations such as these, the Court con-
cluded, "provide an objective and wholly noninvidious basis for the
State's decision not to create a more comprehensive program than it
has." 62
As for the persons covered by the program, Justice Stewart de-
clared:
California does not discriminate with respect to the persons or
55 CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODe § 2626 (West Supp. 1974). Prior to the Supreme Court
argument in Aiello, a California state court ruled that the pregnancy exclusion of the
predecessor of the above-quoted § 2626, ch. 308, § 2626 [1953] Cal. Laws 1531, was limited
to normal pregnancy and childbirth. Rentzer v. California Unemployment Ins. App. Bd.,
32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973). This decision led to an amendment of
§ 2626 which so limited the exclusion. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2626, 2626,2 (West
Supp, 1974). It was in this posture that Aiello reached the Supreme Court.
56Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (ND. Cal. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
57417 U.S. at 492,
58 Id. at 493-94.
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groups which are eligible for disability insurance protection under
the program. The classification challenged in this case relates to
the asserted underinclusiveness of the set of risks that the State
has selected to insure.63
And, as for the selection of those risks, he went on to state:
There is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks
insured by the program worked to discriminate against any de-
finable group or class in terms of the aggregate risk protection
derived by that group or class from the program. There is no risk
from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there
is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.6
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Brennan and joined
in by Justices Douglas and Marshall, expressed the view that the State
program's exclusion of disabilities connected with normal pregnancy
constituted sex discrimination per se. By singling out pregnancy - a
gender-linked disability peculiar to women -for less favorable treat-
ment, the dissenters reasoned, the program creates a double standard
for compensation; men are covered for all disabilities they may suffer
but women are not. "Such dissimilar treatment of men and women,
on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex,"
the dissenting opinion concluded, "inevitably constitutes sex discrimina-
tion."65 At the core of the dissenting opinion is the view that because
only women are capable of becoming pregnant, an exclusion based
upon pregnancy is, per se, discriminatory.6
In a footnote which has become the subject of great controversy
in subsequent Title VII cases, "Footnote 20," the Court expressly re-
jected the view that the state's exclusion of disabilities attributable to
normal pregnancies involved sex discrimination per se and in direct
answer to the dissent stated:
The dissenting opinion to the contrary, this case is thus a far cry
from cases like Reed v. Reed ... and Frontiero v. Richardson...
involving discrimination based upon gender as such. The Califor-
nia insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit
eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical condi-
tion - pregnancy - from the list of compensable disabilities. While
it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-
based classification like those considered in Reed ... and Fron-
tiero .... Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physi-
63 Id. at 494.
641d. at 496-97 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
61 Id. at 501.
0 Id.
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cal condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that
distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex
or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or
exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on
any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical
condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and
gender as such under this insurance program becomes dear upon
the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients
into two groups- pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.
While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes
members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the
program thus accrue to members of both sexes.67
In the Court's view, the equal protection cases of ReedG8 and Fron-
tiero,69 both involving sex discrimination, were distinguishable since
they involved similarly situated persons who were treated differently
on the basis of sex alone. But in Aiello, women were not viewed as
the class excluded from coverage; instead, pregnant women were
deemed to be one class and men and nonpregnant women, another.
As will be discussed more fully in the section of this Article de-
voted to Title VII, several federal courts have read "Footnote 20" as
no more than a continuation of the ongoing debate within the Court
over the standard to be applied in sex discrimination cases under the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The Supreme Court
in the past has treated statutes and programs having a racially discrim-
inatory effect as inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny.70 States are required to demonstrate compelling interests which
cannot otherwise be achieved before the Court will uphold any such
statute or program.7 ' But there has not been a Court majority for the
67 Id. at 496-97 n.20 (citations omitted).
68 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
69411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Reed, males similarly situated to females were preferred
by an Oregon probate statute as administrators of children's estates. In Frontiero, ser-
vicemen could automatically claim spouses as dependents, while similarly situated service-
women were required to prove the dependency of their spouses. In both cases, the goal
of administrative convenience was held by the Court to be an insufficient basis -not a
compelling state interest- for supporting the sex-based classification under the rational
basis test. While Justices Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, and White declared in Frontiero
that sex is an inherently suspect classification, the majority never went that far. See note
72 infra. Justices Powell, Burger, and Blackmun, while finding the challenged provisions
unconstitutional, specifically rejected the inherently suspect approach in deference to the
proposed equal rights amendment: "If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent
the will of the people accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution." 411
U.S. at 692.
70 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 888 U.S. 1 (1967).
71 See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 851, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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proposition that programs and statutes involving sex discrimination
should be evaluated under the same standard.72 The standard used by
the majority in this area has not gone beyond the traditional standard
employed under the equal protection clause, viz., whether the classi-
fication in question "rationally promotes legitimate governmental in-
terests."
73
Other courts have viewed "Footnote 20" as reaching well beyond
a debate on the standards to be applied in analyzing sex discrimination
cases under the equal protection clause.7 4 These courts see in "Footnote
20" a general holding that classifications based on pregnancy do not per
se constitute sex-based discrimination, and, therefore, the singling out
for exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a disability benefits
program is not, standing alone, gender-based discrimination even
though only women can become pregnant.
No mention of Title VII can be found in the majority opinion
in Aiello; nor does it discuss the EEOC's guidelines on pregnancy-
related disability programs. Both proponents and opponents of the
proposition that exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities per se con-
stitutes sex discrimination violative of Title VII have construed the
Supreme Court's silence on these subjects in Aiello as beneficial to
their respective positions. With the grant of certiorari in Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 75 the Supreme Court will soon have the
opportunity to explain the reach of "Footnote 20." Because most em-
ployers in the public and private sectors of the economy are now cov-
ered by Title VII, the practical import of the Aiello decision, which
as indicated above has been construed by several courts as not control-
ling in a Title VII context, has been minimal. A decision in Liberty
Mutual, although not necessarily the ultimate determination on the
subject since other statutes have yet to be tested in this area, ought to
go a long way towards ending the uncertainty for many employers.
72 In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1978), the Justices wrote three separate
opinions. Four Justices adopted the inherently suspect standard; a fifth Justice merely
declared that the statutes worked an invidious discrimination; and three other Justices
agreed that the statutes were unconstitutional without having to reach the question of
whether sex is a suspect classification.
73 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Another recent
Supreme Court case involving sex discrimination is Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 US.
696 (1975), where the Court, in a unanimous decision, declared invalid a provision of
the Social Security Act which granted different survivor benefits to widowers and widows.
This case, like Reed and Frontiero, involved a clear case of similarly situated persons
being treated differently solely on the basis of sex.
74See, e.g., Seaman v. Spring Lake Park Indep. School Dist., 887 F. Supp. 1168 (D.
Minn. 1974); Communications Workers of America v. AT&T, 379 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), re-'d, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975).
7595 S. Ct. 1989 (1975).
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THE TITLE VII STANDARD
As the political observer may recall, the addition of "sex" to the
list of classes to be protected from discrimination by employers and
others covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a tongue-in-cheek
tactic designed to defeat the bill.78 Very little legislative debate is found
in congressional records, and courts, in construing the Act, as far as
sex discrimination is concerned, have little clear legislative intent to
guide them.77 According to the EEOC: "the intent and reach of the
amendment were shrouded in doubt."78 Indeed, the record is bare of
any legislative history to guide the courts in deciding the validity of
the pregnancy-related disability exclusion under Title VII.
The level of development of decisional authority under Title VII
also may be wanting as an analytical framework for deciding a case
such as Liberty Mutual. The neutral rule doctrine announced by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 79 will no doubt be urged
by some as controlling. This doctrine generally provides that where a
facially neutral employment policy has a "foreseeable disproportionate
impact" upon a class protected by Title VII, the policy is unlawful
unless the employer can show its necessity to the operation of the busi-
76 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains ten specific titles. Title VII forbids employ-
ment discrimination based on sex. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended (Supp. III,
1973). Section 2000e-2, defining unlawful employment practices, provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
77 See 110 CoNG. REc. 2577-84 (1964). Note the relatively small number of pages
(eight) of debate. The amendment prohibiting sex discrimination was first introduced by
Congressman Smith (D., Va.). Several of the leading proponents of the bill spoke against
the amendment which was clearly introduced to defeat the bill. These proponents in-
cluded Congressman Celler (D., N.Y.), Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary;
Congressman James Roosevelt (D., Cal.); Congresswoman Green (D., Ore.); and Congress-
man John Lindsay (R., N.Y.), to name a few. Congresswoman Green warned that the
Judiciary Committee failed to consider the problems which would arise out of the
biological differences between the sexes. Id. at 2484.
In the Senate, the amendment, known as the Bennett Amendment and now part of
§ 703(h) of Title VII, was discussed by Senator Randolph (D., W.Va.) as follows: Despite
the sex discrimination prohibition, "differences of treatment in industrial benefit plans,
including earlier retirement options for women, may continue in operation under this
bill, if it becomes law." Id. at 13,663-64.
It is dear that the complex substantive issues facing the courts and industry today
were not contemplated in 1964.
78 EEOC Fntsr ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 86, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1966).
79 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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ness. 0 In practice, however, the courts have been unable to apply this
doctrine or any other theory to formulate a single conceptual frame-
work for dealing with cases involving traits unique to one sex, includ-
ing, of course, cases involving pregnancy.
Title VII cases dealing with other unique, i.e. gender-linked, traits
such as facial hair8 l and with the stereotype of short hair as a proper
male grooming standard 2 have upheld, in some instances, employment
policies relating to such traits or stereotypes, notwithstanding their dis-
proportionate impact on one sex. 3 But the right to grow one's hair or
to keep it at a desired length certainly can be viewed on a different
plane from the right to bear children. The obvious differences in the
relative importance of these rights, it may be argued, militates against
adopting any per se approach for dealing with employment policies
involving gender-linked traits.
The EEOC, nevertheless, has formulated guidelines under Title
VII that make it a per se violation to exclude pregnancy-related dis-
abilities under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick
80 Id. In Griggs, either having a high school diploma or passing a standardized in-
telligence test was a prerequisite for employment. Where neither standard could be shown
to be significantly related to successful job performance, and where the tests had a dis-
proportionately high discriminatory impact on Negroes, the Court held that the use of
such tests was violative of Title VII despite the fact that they were not used or intended
to be used to discriminate on the basis of race. A broad objective test dealing with the
actual discriminatory impact was used rather than a subjective one based solely upon the
employer's intent. See also Gregory v. Litton Syss., Inc., 816 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
81 See, e.g., Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Fla.
1972) (discharge of plaintiffs for refusal to shave moustache and beards not discriminatory
under Title VII).
82 See, e.g., Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mich. 1974)
(two different grooming codes for men and women upheld under Title VII so long as not
a device to hinder or prevent employment).
83 See notes 81-82 supra. In analyzing the effects of the proposed equal rights amend-
ment, H.RJ. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
upon legislation specifically dealing with unique physical characteristics, commentators
provide one approach to this question, viz, that laws under the ERA will of necessity
deal with individual attributes, not with classifications based on sex. Brown, Emerson,
Falk, & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
In this situation it might be said that, in a certain sense, the individual obtains
a benefit or is subject to a restriction because he or she belongs to one or the
other sex.... So long as the law deals only with a characteristic found in all
(or some) women but no men, or in all (or some) men but no women, it does not
ignore individual characteristics found in both sexes in favor of an average based
on one sex. Hence such legislation does not, without more, violate the basic
principle of the Equal Rights Amendment.
Id. at 893 (emphasis added). The authors note that laws establishing medical leave for
childbearing are permissible (though leave for childrearing would have to apply to both
sexes), as are present laws punishing forcible rape and laws relating to determination of
fatherhood. Id. at 894.
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leave program available in connection with employment.8 4 These guide-
lines are the agency's interpretation of the statute. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.s5 is often cited in support of the rule that interpreta-
tions of a statute by an administrative agency enforcing that statute
are normally accorded "great deference" by the courts. Insofar as these
interpretations lack force of law and may not accurately interpret the
statute, however, courts have found that they are not bound to apply
them.86
In Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.87 the Supreme Court held
that the EEOC had misinterpreted the Act and therefore the EEOC
guidelines concerning the interpretation of "national origin" versus
citizenship under the Act were rejected:
The Commission's more recent interpretation of the statute in the
guideline relied on by the District Court is no doubt entitled to
great deference .... but that deference must have limits where, as
here, application of the guideline would be inconsistent with an
obvious congressional intent. . . . Courts need not defer to an
administrative construction of a statute where there are "com-
pelling indications that it is wrong."88
Thus it remains for the courts to determine whether the EEOC's guide-
lines on pregnancy are consistent or inconsistent with their own con-
struction of the sex discrimination prohibitions contained in Title VII.
"Footnote 20" of Aiello cannot be ignored; employers will contend
84 The following guidelines covering employment policies relating to pregnancy and
childbirth were issued by the EEOC:
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from
employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima fade viola-
tion of title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary dis-
ability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment.
Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such
as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the
accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment
under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or
informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the
same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is
caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is avail-
able, such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees
of one sex and is not justified by business necessity.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1974).
85401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
86 See, e.g., Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973), wherein
the court rejected EEOC pregnancy guidelines on the ground that they were apparently
promulgated without a proper factual foundation.
87414 U.S. 86 (1973).
88 Id. at 94-95 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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that it provides a compelling, if not controlling, indication that the
agency's guidelines are erroneous.
The first post-Aiello Title VII case involving pregnancy exclusion
to reach the circuit courts was Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.8 9 Affirming the district court's grant of partial summary judgment,
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the employer's
exclusion of pregnancy benefits from its income protection sickness and
accident program violated Title VII. The court rejected the employer's
contention that the EEOC's guidelines on pregnancy were undeserving
of judicial deference since they were contrary to earlier positions taken
by the EEOC 0 and wholly inconsistent with the policy and under-
standing of the statute. The court concluded that, unlike Espinoza,
there are no compelling indications that the EEOC position or guide-
lines on pregnancy are wrong or in any way inconsistent with any con-
gressional intent.91 And as to the EEOC's reversal of its earlier posi-
tions on this subject, the court observed: "This evolutionary process
is a necessary function of our legal system - a system that must remain
flexible and adaptable to ever-changing concepts of our society. '92
Finally, the current guidelines were given great deference by the court:
"We feel that the legislative purpose of the Act is furthered by the
89 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1989 (1975).
90 Although guidelines on discrimination based on sex were issued by the EEOC in
1965, 80 Fed. Reg. 14,926 (1965), and amended in 1968, 33 Fed. Reg. 3344 (1968), and 1969,
34 Fed. Reg. 13,367 (1969), it was not until the most recent amendments, effective April
5, 1972, that any view was expressed in the guidelines as to how pregnancy-related dis-
abilities were to be treated. These guidelines are set forth in note 84 supra. Public expres-
sion by the EEOC of how pregnancy should be treated under Title VII did, however,
appear in other forms prior to 1972. For example, the EEOC First Annual Report, issued
for the fiscal year 1966, EEOC Fmsr ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 86, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1966), states:
The prohibition against sex discrimination is especially difficult to apply with
respect to the female employee who becomes pregnant. In all other questions
involving sex discrimination, the underlying principle is the essential equality
of treatment for male and female employees. The pregnant female, however, has
no analogous male counterpart and pregnancy necessarily must be treated
uniquely.
Id. at 40. The EEOC then concluded:
The Commission does not have a comprehensive policy on pregnancy ....
Id. The EEOC's early policy was also reflected in a Commission decision issued on Decem-
ber 16, 1969 which states in part:
The Commission policy with respect to pregnancy does not seek to compare an
employer's treatment of illness or injury with his treatment of maternity since
maternity is a temporary disability unique to the female sex.... Accordingly,
we believe that to provide substantial equality of employment opportunity ...
there must be special recognition for absences due to pregnancy ....
1973 CCH EEOC Dec. 4130 (1969), quoting EEOC Opinion Letter, Nov. 15, 1966.
91511 F.2d at 205. See also note 105 infra. The legislative history on the addition of
"sex" as a protected area under Title VII was characterized by the court as "indeed
meager." 511 F.2d at 204.
921Id. at 205.
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EEOC guidelines and that the guidelines are consistent with the plain
meaning of the statute." 93
The employer in Liberty Mutual maintained that Aiello was con-
trolling and completely dispositive of the case. The court disagreed,
distinguishing Aiello on the grounds that, unlike the case before it,
Aiello (1) presented a question of constitutional analysis of sex discrim-
ination under the equal protection clause and not one of statutory in-
terpretation under Title VII, and (2) involved a public social welfare
program excluding only normal pregnancies and not a private plan
excluding both abnormal and normal pregnancies. 94 After rejecting the
employer's arguments that pregnancy is neither a sickness nor invol-
untary, and agreeing with the EEOC that the increased cost of coverage
is no defense, the Third Circuit concluded:
We believe that an income protection plan that covers so many
temporary disabilities but excludes pregnancy because it is not a
sickness discriminates against women and cannot stand.95
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the next circuit
court to be called upon to determine Aiello's effect on Title VII cases
involving a pregnancy exclusion from a disability plan. In Communi-
cations Workers of America v. A T&T,96 the district court had dismissed
a suit by the CWA to secure disability benefits for pregnant women
employees. "Footnote 20" of the Aiello opinion was viewed by Judge
Knapp of the district court as "the key to the [Aiello] Court's decision."
He stated:
The holding was that California's treatment of pregnancy related
disabilities did not in and of itself constitute a discrimination
based on sex (or gender). Such a holding precludes relief under
Title VII . . .9
The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. Addressing the "narrow
question" of whether Aiello, as a matter of law, required dismissal of
the union's suit under Title VII, the court concluded that Aiello was
not decisive of the issue raised in the Title VII case before it and that
the lower court therefore erred in dismissing the complaint.98 The
court observed that Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not require
93 Id.
94 Id. at 203.
95 Id. at 206.
98379 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No. 74-1601).
97 379 F. Supp. at 682.
98 513 F.2d at 1028.
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that the forbidden discriminatory practices be limited to practices vio-
lative of the equal protection clause. Indeed, practices outlawed by
Title VII and the EEOC guidelines may nonetheless be able to survive
attack under the equal protection clause. Further, as to the EEOC
guidelines on pregnancy and the proposition that the Aiello holding
invalidated them, the Second Circuit remarked: "It is inconceivable that
the majority opinion intended so to hold without even a mention of
Title VII or the guidelines."19
On June 27, 1975, some three months after the Second Circuit
decided Communications Workers and about four months after the
Third Circuit handed down its decision in Liberty Mutual, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided Gilbert v. General Electric
Co.100 Gilbert, like Communications Workers and Liberty Mutual, was
a post-Aiello Title VII decision involving a disability program exclud-
ing pregnancy. Finding that the pregnancy exclusion before it violated
Title VII, the court in a split decision followed the lead of the Third
Circuit in Liberty Mutual. It held that the exclusion of pregnancy
benefits under a companywide program which granted general disabil-
ity benefits constitutes sex-based discrimination under Title VII. The
court reasoned that
[p]regnancy is a condition unique to women and a basic charac-
teristic of their sex. A disability program which, while granting
disability benefits generally, denies such benefits expressly for dis-
ability arising out of pregnancy, a disability possible only among
women, is manifestly one which can result in a less comprehensive
program of employee compensation and benefits for women em-
ployees than for men employees; and would do so on the basis of
sex.101
091d. at 1080 (footnote omitted). The remand to the district court for determination
of the Title VII issue may prove unimportant in light of the Supreme Court's decision
to review Liberty Mutual.
100 10 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1201 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 44 US.L.W. 8200
(U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 74-589).
Since Gilbert, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have also con-
fronted the pregnancy disability exclusion issue. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 11 BNA Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1 (6th Cir. 1975), dealt with whether the exclusion of pregnancy-related
disabilities from a private employer's sick leave and seniority program was violative of
Title VII. Rejecting the employer's contention that Aiello was controlling, the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that the "disparate treatment between pregnancy leave and other sick leave
constitutes a violation of Title VII ..." Id. at 4. Similarly, in Hutchison v. Lake
Oswego School Dist., 11 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 161 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit,
having found that Aiello is not determinative of the issue, ruled that the denial of sick
leave benefits to a pregnant schoolteacher violated Title VII.
10110 BNA Fair Empl. Pac. Cas. at 1203 (emphasis added). See also Holthaus v.
Compton & Sons, Inc., 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975); Farkas v. Southwestern City School
Dist., 506 F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974) (mem.).
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General Electric argued to the contrary, contending that the preg-
nancy exclusion was not gender-based discrimination per se, rely-
ing on "Footnote 20" of the Aiello opinion. The majority, in re-
jecting this argument, noted that Aiello was not controlling.10 2 It
read Aiello as deciding that the preguancy classification under the social
welfare program there involved was discriminatory but rationally sup-
portable and not invidious.10  But Title VII, the court pointed out,
does not authorize such a rationality test; "[ilt represents a flat and
absolute prohibition against all sex discrimination in conditions of
employment."' 04 Deference was granted to the EEOC pregnancy guide-
lines by the Gilbert majority, but it was noted that the result would
have been the same had no guidelines been issued.10 5
The dissenter, Judge Widener, read Aiello as precluding the hold-
ing reached by the majority.0 6 The inquiry in any sex discrimination
case, he reasoned, must focus initially on whether the employment prac-
tice in question constitutes sex discrimination. If it is not sex discrim-
ination, then, regardless of what standard is applied, whether it be equal
102 10 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1206. In Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 11 BNA
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1 (6th Cir. 1975), the Sixth Circuit, adopting this same approach,
stated:
It would appear harsh to read into footnote 20 that the Court expected . . .
to preclude all future discussion of statutory interpretation under a relatively
new act such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Appellant contends that the test of the validity of an employment policy
under Title VII is not different from the test of validity under the Fourteenth
Amendment. This argument, however, presupposes that the lawful scope of em-
ployment policies under the former Act is coextensive with the latter constitu-
tional provision. We believe that the better approach permits Title VII under
the Commerce Clause to extend beyond the reach of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). Accord, Hutchison v. Lake Oswego
School Dist., 11 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 161 (9th Cir. 1975). Several district courts
have also refused to find that Aiello is controlling in a Title VII context. See, e.g., Sale
v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Vineyard v.
Hollister Elementary School Dist., 64 F.R.D. 580 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
103 10 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1205.
104Id. (footnote omitted).
105 Id. at 1203 n.12. The Gilbert court refused to accept defendant's contention that
the "waffling" between the EEOC's earlier opinions and its present position should mini-
mize the weight to be afforded the guidelines. The Fourth Circuit noted, as did the
district court, "that the guidelines, as presently promulgated, are merely expressive of
what is the obvious meaning and purpose of the Act." Id. Accord, Hutchison v. Lake
Oswego School Dist., 11 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 161, 164 (9th Cir. 1975).
Great deference was also granted the EEOC's guidelines in Satty v. Nashville Gas Co.,
11 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1 (6th Cir. 1975), wherein the Sixth Circuit observed that
"absent clear indicia in the form of legislative history that the agency interpretation is
unreasonable or unnatural, we must defer to the Commission's construction of the statute
as articulated under [the guidelines]." Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
106 10 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1206 (Widener, J., dissenting). See also Hutchison
v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 11 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 161, 167 (9th Cir. 1975)
(Schnacke, J., dissenting).
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protection, Title VII, or any other, there is no violation. Accordingly,
if the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities is not sex-based dis-
crimination, there can be no Title VII violation.10 7 Judge Widener,
quoting from "Footnote 20" of the Aiello opinion, found the following
"flat statement" of the Supreme Court controlling on the question of
whether a pregnancy disability exclusion is sex-based discrimination:
"The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as
such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cur-
sory analysis."' 0 Since the exclusion at issue in Gilbert was precisely the
same as that before the Supreme Court in Aiello, the dissenting opinion
reasoned, it should no more support a finding of discrimination under
Title VII than it did under the equal protection clause. 09 The dissent
further reasoned that the fact that the exclusion appears in a collective
bargaining agreement in Gilbert and not in state legislation as in Aiello
should not make any difference."
Judge Widener argued that Aiello "was written with an eye to
Title VII cases certain to come, not in a vacuum .... I" His disagree-
ment with the majority is buttressed by the illogical results bound to
follow adherence to the majority's approach. Because a state disability
plan covering its own employees is covered by Title VII,"2 the state
would, under the Gilbert holding, not be permitted to exclude preg-
nancy from its coverage. Yet such an exclusion could freely be made
in a state plan covering private employees of private employers such
as that in Aiello." s
The dissent read Aiello as posing a two-step analytical framework.
First, was there discrimination on the basis ofsex? Second, if so, was
it defensible on any legally acceptable ground? While the second step
of analysis may conceivably produce differing results in the statutory
context of Title VII and the constitutional context of the fourteenth
amendment, the first step should yield the same answer in either con-
text."x4 The primary difference in the interpretation of "Footnote 20"
between, on the one hand, the dissent in Gilbert and district court
opinion of Judge Knapp in Communications Workers and, on the
other hand, the circuit court opinions in Gilbert, Communications
Workers, and Liberty Mutual is that the former focus on the first step
107 10 BNA Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. at 1205.
108 Id., quoting Geduldig v. AieHo, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974).
109 10 BNA Fair Empi. Prac. Cas. at 1205.
1101d, at 1207.
Ill Id.
112 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. m, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970).
113 10 BNA Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1207.
114 Id.
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of the analysis just described, while the latter completely ignore that
step, focusing instead on drawing distinctions between the constitu-
tional and statutory contexts on the basis of the second step of the
analysis. Consideration of elements pertinent to the second step might
be totally irrelevant, it is submitted, if the first step yields the answer
that the employment policy in question does not constitute sex dis-
crimination.
A number of relevant Title VII judicial precedents are in accord
with the conclusions perceived by Judges Knapp and Widener as flow-
ing from "Footnote 20" of the Aiello opinion. These cases view the
essence of the prohibition against sex discrimination contained in Title
VII as barring different treatment on the basis of sex of persons simi-
larly situated and qualified. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,"15
for example, the Supreme Court stated that "Section 703(a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964116 requires that persons of like qualifications
be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex."'1 17 That
case involved a company policy of refusing to hire women with pre-
school age children. Men with children of the same ages, however, were
hired. The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision which
had upheld the policy and remanded the case. The lower court had
erred in reading Title VII, the Supreme Court wrote, insofar as it
believed that the statute permitted one hiring policy for women and
another for men - each having preschool age children. The proper test
to be applied is whether persons of "like qualifications" were treated
differently because they were of opposite sexes.118
This same rationale was applied by the district court in Rafford
v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc.119 Claiming that they were
discharged for refusing to shave their beards and moustaches, the male
employees in Rafford argued that such action constituted sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII because it was based solely on a special male
characteristic, viz, the growth of facial hair. The court refused to find
sex discrimination, characterizing as absurd the simplistic concept that
any practice based on a sex-linked physical trait constitutes per se sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII. It then articulated what it
saw as the appropriate standard:
115 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
116 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
117 400 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added).
118Accord, Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971) (section 703(a)(1) violated where airline policy required that steward-
esses be unmarried, but there was no similar rule for male personnel).
119 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
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Virtually all Title VII violations fit an equal protection definition
of sex discrimination -dissimilar treatment for similarly situated
men and women, where the treatment is based on sex.... Here,
however, the Court is presented with a case where there can be no
similarly situated members of the opposite sex. An analogy, for
which there is some precedent, posits the discharge of a pregnant
woman.
... The discharge of pregnant women or bearded men does
not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 simply because only women
become pregnant and only men grow beards. In neither instance
are similarly situated persons of the opposite sex favored. These
cases are perhaps more properly considered under the rubric of
Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. ... , that discrimination between
different categories of the same sex is not unlawful discrimination
by sex. 12 0
It might be contended that "Footnote 20" of Aiello, like Rafford,
stands for the proposition, applicable to any sex discrimination case
regardless of context, that the mere fact that an employment policy
takes cognizance of a sex-linked trait does not by itself make it sex
discrimination in violation of law. There must also be an element of
favoritism toward similarly situated persons of the opposite sex. That
favoritism cannot exist where, as in the case of pregnancy, no member
of the opposite sex can be so similarly situated.
The confusion surrounding the effect to be given Aiello in the
Title VII context has produced uncertainty among employers, em-
ployees, and unions. The Supreme Court, as indicated earlier in this
Article, will have the opportunity to eliminate such confusion when
it decides Liberty Mutual during the 1975-1976 term.
THE STANDARD UNDER OTHER FEDERAL LAWS
Equal Pay Act
Regulations promulgated by the Wage and Hour Administrator
of the United States Department of Labor under the Equal Pay Act
of 1963121 provide that payments relating to maternity are not wages
for purposes of that statute.122 The regulations also provide:
If employer contributions to a plan providing insurance or similar
120 Id. at 519-20 (emphasis added) (citaitons omitted). Accord, Willingham v. Macon
Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975), vacating 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973);
Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam); Fagan v. National
Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973), all holding that male grooming stan-
dards are not violative of Title VII.
12129 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
12229 C.F.R. § 800.110 (1974).
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benefits to employees are equal for both men and women, no wage
differential prohibited by the equal pay provisions will result
from such payments, even though the benefits which accrue to the
employees in question are greater for one sex than for the other.123
This standard of equal contributions or equal benefits, if applied
to the disability plans involved in Aiello, Liberty Mutual, Communi-
cations Workers, and Gilbert, would probably validate them. There
was no indication in the courts' opinions in those cases that employer
contributions, if any, were greater for men than for women. Moreover,
the Aiello opinion noted that experience revealed that the aggregate
benefits under the California program were greater for women than
for men. 24
Executive Order 11,246
The sex discrimination guidelines promulgated by the Secretary
of Labor pursuant to Executive Order 11,246125 apply to most govern-
ment contractors and subcontractors. They incorporate the equal con-
tributions or equal benefits approach and, accordingly, do not require
that employee medical benefit plans cover pregnancy-related disabili-
ties as long as an employer makes equal contributions for employees
of both sexes.126
On December 27, 1973, however, the Secretary of Labor published
proposed revisions127 to the guidelines requiring that pregnancy-related
disabilities be treated as temporary disabilities. This proposed guide-
line is in line with the existing EEOC guidelines on pregnancy. While
the validity of these proposed guidelines, as a technical matter, would
not be controlled by a decision under Title VII and the EEOC guide-
lines, as a practical matter the OFCC, which oversees the application
of the Secretary's guidelines to government contractors and subcon-
tractors, would probably be guided by such a decision.128 In any event,
the OFCC may elect not to adopt the proposed guidelines until the
Supreme Court issues an opinion in Liberty Mutual concerning the
EEOC guidelines.
THE NEw YoRK STANDARD
The highest court of the State of New York first considered "sev-
eral facets" of pregnancy and childbirth in the employment relationship
123 Id. § 800.116(d).
124 417 U.S. at 496, 497 n.21.
125 3 C.F.R. 170 (1974).
12641 id. § 60-20.3(c) (1975).
127 Proposed Labor Reg. § 60-20, 38 Fed. Reg. 35,337 (1973).
128 Id. at 35,336 (Commentary).
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in three cases' 29 decided in October 1974 under the State's Human
Rights Law. 30 In affirming, without opinion, the decision below in
each of the cases, the New York Court of Appeals adopted the opinion
of Justice Hopkins in Board of Education (East Williston) v. New
York State Division of Human Rights,13 1 one of the trilogy of cases
under review, where it was held that the Human Rights Law prohibits
employers from singling out pregnancy for special treatment in deter-
mining leave from duty.
The school board policy challenged in East Williston required a
pregnant teacher to take an unpaid leave of absence no later than five
months prior to the expected delivery date. In deciding the case, the
Appellate Division, Second Department, rejecting as inapplicable the
constitutional standard exemplified by Reed' 32 and applying instead
the more rigorous standard of the Human Rights Law, stated:
The Human Rights Law is undoubtedly a function of the equal
protection guarantee, but it reflects a more direct and positive
focus.... Though in a sense the equal protection clause deals with
classes, the Human Rights Law in contrast deals with individuals.
The statute in essence prevents disparate treatment of individuals,
having regard for their abilities, capacities and qualifications ... .133
The true test to be applied under the Human Rights Law, Justice
Hopkins wrote, is whether the employment policy has a "reasonable
foundation." Declaring the school board's regulation invalid, the
appellate division pointed out that the purpose of the regulation, to
secure "continuity of competent instruction," was not promoted by
demanding an involuntary leave at four months "any more than it
would [be] by demanding absence at six or eight months."'' 34 A similar
mandatory maternity leave policy was struck down in Board of Educa-
129 Board of Educ. (East Williston) v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 35
N.Y.2d 673, 319 N.E2d 202, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974) (mem.), af'g 42 App. Div. 2d 49,
345 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1973); Board of Educ. (City of New York) v. State Div. of
Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 675, 319 N.E.2d 203, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974) (mem.), aff'g 42
App. Div. 2d 854, 346 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1973) (mem.); Board of Educ. (Oyster Bay
and Babylon) v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 677, 319 N.E.2d 203,
360 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1974) (mem.), aff'g 42 App. Div. 2d 600, 345 N.Y.S.2d 101 (2d Dep't
1973) (mem.).
130 N.Y. Exac. LAw §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1972), as amended (Supp. 1974). The Human
Rights Law of New York provides, in part: "The opportunity to obtain employment
without discrimination because of race, creed, sex, color or national origin is hereby
recognized as and declared to be a civil right." Id. § 291(1).
13135 N.Y.2d 673, 319 N.E.2d 202, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974), aff'g 42 App. Div. 2d 49,
345 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1973).
132 42 App. Div. 2d at 52, 345 N.YS.2d at 97.
133 Id. (citations omitted).
134Id. at 53, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 98.
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tion (Oyster Bay and Babylon) v. New York State Division of Human
Rights,135 another of the trilogy of cases.
In the third case of the trilogy, a different facet of the maternity
question was at issue. The New York Court of Appeals, in Board of
Education (City of New York) v. State Division of Human Rights,136
ruled that the Human Rights Law requires that a pregnant teacher
who takes a pregnancy-related leave must be permitted to take advan-
tage of her sick and sabbatical leave entitlements to the same extent
as would one suffering from some other temporary physical disability.137
The State Division of Human Rights, whose determination was under
review in this case, had found that the board discriminated against the
schoolteacher in denying her sick leave and other benefits for which
male teachers suffering from temporary physical disability would have
been eligible.
In Union Free School District No. 6 (Town of Islip) v. New York
State Human Rights Appeal Board,18 8 a posttrilogy and post-Aiello
case, the complainant schoolteacher wished to return to her position
five months earlier than the school board would permit and to preserve
her right to various fringe benefits. 39 She asserted that the Board's
paid sick leave benefits should be applied to pregnancy in the same
way it is applied to other temporary disabilities. In affirming the ap-
pellate division's decision, the New York Court of Appeals for the first
time wrote an opinion on the subject of maternity and employment
practices and policies under the Human Rights Law. The opinion
contained a brief analysis of Aiello in relation to Title VII, the New
York law, and the constitutional standard.
Citing with approval the district court's approach in Liberty Mu-
tual'40 - that a provision deemed constitutional may still violate Title
VII- the court stated: "were the Supreme Court to declare that ex-
clusion of pregnancy and maternity benefits was to no extent based on
sex, we would not be obliged to accept such determination for the pur-
'35 35 N.Y.2d 677, 319 N.E.2d 203, 860 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1974), af'g 42 App. Div. 2d
600, 345 N.Y.S.2d 101 (2d Dep't 1973).
13635 N.Y.2d 675, 319 N.E.2d 203, 360 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1974), aff'g 42 App. Div. 2d
854, 346 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d Dep't 1973).
137 Id.
13835 N.Y.2d 371, 320 N.E.2d 859, 362 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1974), af'g 43 App. Div. 2d
749, 350 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1973).
139 See 43 App. Div. 2d 749, 350 N.Y.S.2d 735 (2d Dep't 1973).
140 35 N.Y.2d at 877, 320 N.E2d at 861, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 142, quoting Wetzel v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1159 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("While a fixed state
policy of classification may survive an equal protection attack it may still be violative
of Title VII.').
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poses of the application of our State's Human Rights Law."'' In
holding that the Board's policy was discriminatory and prohibited by
the Human Rights Law, the court concluded: "what the Constitution
does not forbid may nonetheless be proscribed by statute. In East
Williston and City of New York, it had been. The case now before us
is no different."'14 2 Thus, the New York courts are bound to treat ar-
bitrary mandatory maternity and sick leave policies that differentiate
between pregnancy disabilities and other temporary disabilities as
violative of the Human Rights Law. The exclusion of pregnancy from
paid sick leave programs in such cases apparently will be viewed as
sex discrimination per se.
Left undecided by the Town of Islip opinion is its application to a
state disability benefits program covering employees of private em-
ployers such as the type involved in Aiello and to an insured or self-
insured program of disability benefits such as those involved in Liberty
Mutual, Communications Workers, and Gilbert. Indeed, the only em-
ployment policies under review in Town of Islip were a public employ-
er's maternity and paid sick leave policies. That this question has been
left open by the court is of crucial importance to New York employers
in the private sector since under New York law, nongovernmental
employers are required to provide disability benefits coverage for their
employees under an insured program.
The New York Disability Benefits Law143 specifies the level and
type of disability coverage that New York employers must provide
either through participation in the state insurance fund or through
other private insurance plans, including a program of self-insurance.
The New York system represents a comprehensive system of mandatory
disability insurance providing for payments in lieu of wages when an
employee is disabled by nonoccupational injury or sickness. In this
regard, it is similar to the California program involved in Aiello, and,
as in Aiello, the New York plan excludes pregnancy-related disability.
Section 205 provides that employees are not entitled to benefits
for any period of disability caused by or arising in connection
with a pregnancy, except any such period occurring after return
to employment with a covered employer for a period of two con-
secutive weeks following termination of such pregnancy .... 144
14135 N.Y.2d at 377 n.1, 820 N.E2d at 861 n.1, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 142 n.1.
142 Id. at 377-78, 320 N.E.2d at 861, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
143 N.Y. WoRIMEN's Comp. LAw §§ 200-42 (McKinney 1965), as amended (Supp. 1974).
1441d. § 205(3) (McKinney 1965).
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This exclusion of pregnancy was long a part of the statute when, in
1965, the New York State Legislature added the prohibition against
discrimination on account of sex to the Human Rights Law.145 But
there is no legislative history discussing this amendment to section
296(l)(a) of the Human Rights Law and its impact, if any, on the exclu-
sion. Any determination by the courts that disability benefits programs
created pursuant to the Disability Benefits Law are violative of section
296(l)(a) of the Human Rights Law insofar as they exclude pregnancy
would, in effect, repeal the pregnancy exclusion contained in section
205.
This circumstance was brought to the attention of the New York
Court of Appeals by various amici curiae in their respective motions
to intervene in support of the school district's motion for reargument
in the Town of Islip case. It was argued that under general rules of
statutory construction it must be presumed that the legislature was
aware of the specific exclusion in section 205 of the Disability Benefits
Law when it amended section 296(l)(a) of the Human Rights Law and
that the latter must be construed with reference to the former. The
court was also reminded of the fundamental rule often followed by it
in other cases involving statutory construction that repeals by implica-
tion are not favored.146
In denying the motion for leave to reargue the court indicated that
the issues raised by petitioner school board and amici might be consid-
ered at "some future date." Thus, the status of disability plans of New
York employers which exclude pregnancy must await some future de-
termination by the state courts. It is clear from the Court of Appeal's
analysis in Town of Islip that this determination will be made inde-
pendent of and without regard to the United States Supreme Court
decision in Aiello and any future decision by the Court in Liberty
Mutual.
CONCLUSION
A complex and ever-widening substratum of related, but not gen-
erally controlling, issues has grown in this area. Is pregnancy either a
sickness or an accident; and is it voluntary? Is it a disability or merely
a unique physical condition? What increased costs might employers
and/or employees incur should pregnancy-related disabilities be in-
145 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(I)(a) (McKinney 1972).
146 See, e.g., People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.2d 379, 389-90, 298 N.E2d 651, 656-57, 345
N.Y.S.2d 502, 509-10 (1973); People v. Mann, 31 N.Y.2d 253, 257-58, 288 N.E.2d 595, 597-98,
336 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (1972); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 6 N.Y.2d 127, 141-42, 160 N.E.2d
60, 67-68, 188 N.Y.S.2d 515, 524 (1959).
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cluded in existing disability benefit plans? Would inclusion breed wide-
spread abuses? Is exclusion a business necessity? Should the courts
defer to EEOC guidelines on pregnancy? What weight, if any, should
courts give to insurance principles which have been consistently applied
in connection with the exclusion of pregnancy as a covered risk? What
standards should be applied in constitutional cases involving claims of
sex discrimination? And, finally, what did the Court in Aiello really
mean by "Footnote 20"?
The ultimate question which inevitably must surface and be an-
swered is whether the exclusion of a pregnancy-related disability from
disability benefits plans constitutes sex discrimination. The answer to
this question oftentimes seems to depend on the analytical framework
employed by the person answering it. Some have urged that the exclu-
sion be examined on the basis of its "disproportionate impact" on
women. Others have contended that the issue should be whether "sim-
ilarly situated" persons have received different treatment because of
their sex. Proponents of inclusion have pointed to the fact that preg-
nancy sometimes is the only disability excluded from the coverage of
disability plans. Opponents like to emphasize that many, if not most,
disability plans excluding pregnancy actually favor women since they
still receive a larger share of the aggregate benefits than do men.
Although facially appealing to some, it seems simplistic to deter-
mine the validity of the pregnancy exclusion on the basis of the propo-
sition that since only women can become pregnant any employment
policy which treats pregnancy different from other temporary disabil-
ities must always, regardless of the circumstances, be deemed discrimina-
tory on the basis of sex. Equally simplistic, and equally appealing to
others, is the proposition that since men and women can never be
similarly situated with regard to pregnancy, the pregnancy exclusion
may never amount to sex discrimination. To this writer, the only ad-
vantage to recommend either of these propositions is ease of application.
The elements of a fairer and more reasonable solution may ul-
timately be found in the rationale contained in "Footnote 20" of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Aiello. What is significant is the Court's
refusal to adopt the per se approach inherent both in the propositions
described above and in the existing EEOC guidelines on pregnancy.
The majority chose, instead, to fashion a more flexible standard which,
by its nature, could be applied on a case-by-case basis. Thus the exclu-
sion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a disability benefits program
will not, without more, constitute sex discrimination. However, should
the exclusion be found pretextual or, should the overall design and
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operation of the disability benefits program provide significantly less
benefits for women than for men, such an exclusion might, under all
of the circumstances, amount to gender-based discrimination.
This standard may be applied by the courts equally and consis-
tently both in the constitutional context, as in Aiello, and under Title
VII and the other enactments discussed in this Article to determine
whether or not the pregnancy exclusion in any particular disability
benefits plan constitutes sex discrimination. Where in a specific case
it is determined that gender-based discrimination exists, then, and only
then, would the court be required to examine any other elements which
might be pertinent to establish a violation under the specific statute or
constitutional provision involved. The court would also consider any
defenses interposed which are recognized under such statutes or con-
stitutional provisions. This approach would significantly reduce the
risks of obtaining different results in different forums. It, moreover,
does not conflict with any expressed legislative intent concerning Title
VII or any other federal or state enactment proscribing sex discrimina-
tion in the employment context.
